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MORE LESSONS FROM JAPAN 
END INDUSTRYWIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Robert H. Lande 
University of Baltimore 
and 
Richard O. Zerbe 
University of Washington 
The number of books and articles discussing Japanese management 
techniques with an eye to transplanting them to the United States is 
staggering. Americans understandably are impressed by Japanese 
efficiency and like to think the adoption of some of their techniques 
will aid our own industries. Often these proposals seem fanciful and 
fail to recognize the many differences between the two countries, their 
economic systems and cultures. 
There remains an important aspect of the Japanese economic system 
that could contribute significantly to the efficiency of the United States 
economy that has received scant attention; the Japanese collective 
bargaining structure. Japan has very little effective industrywide 
collective bargaining. Unlike the United States, in Japan the most 
important labor negotiations typically occur at the plant level, or at 
most at the company leveI.2 In the United States, of course it is possible 
for all the employees in an industry to bargain together, collectively, 
against all the management of that industry. In other words, the antitrust 
exception enjoyed by unions allows all the workers in an industry to 
"conspire" to fix their own wages, and all the employers in the industry 
to "conspire" to negotiate in opposition.3 This exemption attempts to 
promote the national goal of providing for potential equality in 
bargaining strength between labor and management.4 The current labor 
exemption to the antitrust laws may not, however, be the most efficient 
way to achieve this goal. 
Our alternative is to treat unions identically to corporations under 
the antitrust laws. In this article we contrast the efficiencies and 
inefficiencies of this alternative with those arising from the existing 
labor exemption. We contend that the current United States system 
may promote unnecessary inefficiencies which retard the United States 
economy. Our alternative would allow, for example, most, but not all, 
horizontal union mergers (or union attempts to organize workers or 
union attempts to work together or to form joint ventures) and virtually 
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all vertical and conglomerate union alignments. But our proposal would 
not allow all the workers (or the employers) in a large industry to 
"conspire" to affect wages, hours, or working conditions. 
We propose that the Japanese management/labor relationship be 
studied more closely and that their lack of industrywide collective 
bargaining be considered as the rule in the United States. We show that 
our proposal rests comfortably between the existing U.S. and Japanese 
positions and we raise the possibility that our approach would combine 
many of the strengths of each nation's systems, while avoiding many 
of the weaknesses inherent in each. It could, we believe, provide for 
labor-management bargaining equality, yet do so in a significantly 
more efficient manner that the existing system. 
II. THE JAPANESE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM 
The current Japanese collective bargaining system starts with the 
goal of worker-management equality (similar to that in the U.S.), that 
is "to elevate the status of workers ... [to] equalize standing with their 
employers [s]" Japanese Law No. 1740fJune 1, 1949, art. 1 (amended).5 
But the Japanese system has evolved in a dramatically different direction. 
In Japan, unions are primarily organized on a plantwide basis. 
Even different plants within the same company typically have separate, 
truly independent unions. Unions, or effective collections of unions, 
spanning more than one employer are almost nonexistent; approximately 
90 percent of unionized workers in Japan belong to company-specific 
"enterprise unions."6 And, while national federations of enterprise 
unions do exist, they are loosely organized, with small staffs, and only 
have the power to advise the enterprise unions on negotiating goals and 
tactics.7 These federations do provide advice concerning the enterprise 
unions' annual "spring offensive" and also engage in political activity. 
They are similar to our trade associations, and there are no organizations 
in Japan comparable to the United Automobile Workers, the United 
Steel Workers, or the Teamsters. A Japanese Ministry of Labor study 
showed that only 5 percent of labor negotiations surveyed involved 
union officials from outside the company.8 Compare this to the 
coordinated activity among constituent unions comprising typical United 
States national labor organizations. 
Not only is the bottom line in Japan that each enterprise union 
acts independently. The U.S. notion that all comparable workers within 
an industry should be paid comparable wages is not a significant 
concern in Japan. Competition on the basis of labor rates has not been 
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eliminated.9 
The Japanese system can be explained better by sociology than 
by government regulation. It evolved in part from the paternalistic 
attitude of Japanese employers towards their workers, and the sense of 
obligation and loyalty on the part of Japanese workers towards their 
companies. The system arose from the same ethic which produces 
exceptionally hard workers who take pride in the quality of their 
teamwork, their ultimate products and services, and the reputation of I 
their company. Japanese employers take a great deal of interest in the 
"non-business" aspects of employee' lives - firms are much more 
likely to playa role in securing employee housing, or schooling for 
employees' children, or to arrange company social events, than are 
U.S. companies. This has led to a close relationship between labor and 
management and a desire on both sides to avoid labor strife. And, of 
course, major employers typically offer lifetime security to permanent 
employees. For all these reasons, Japanese employees generally think 
in terms of movement within a company rather than movement between 
companies. Their attention is focused on their company rather than 
upon their trade. A worker at Toyota or Honda tends to identify himself 
or herself as an employee of that company, rather than as an auto 
worker or a member of the Japanese equivalent of the UA W. iO 
The Japanese system of plantwide or company-wide unions 
provides workers with many of the same types of benefits sought by 
American unions (these will be discussed in more detail later in this 
article). For example, such unions may be able to prevent opportunistic 
behavior by employees or their employer, provide credibility for long-
term contracts, and prevent public goods/free rider problems. By contrast i 
with American unions, a plantwide or company-wide union may become 
more attuned and responsive to the particular needs of its plant or I 
company.11 This can help the employer, both directly and indirectly, by 
further cementing workers' loyalties to their company. 
The Japanese system is not without deficiencies. Many unions in 
Japan are unduly weak, ineffective and dominated by management. 
They typically have meager strike funds and their leaders often lack 
organization or negotiation skillsY In short, even though Japanese 
unions are coextensive with their employer's plant or company, they 
may not achieve equality, in terms of effective bargaining power, with 
management. 
We emphasize that we are not proposing that the United Stat~s 
adopt the Japanese system. Our proposal would, in fact, permIt 
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ooperation or mergers between modestly sized horizontally competing 
~nions, and virtually any vertical or horizontal arrangement between 
unions. Any absolute size thresholds for effective union management, 
negotiating ability, organizing expertise, or fi~ancial strength, .would 
be obtainable through small honzontal, or VIrtually any vertical or 
conglomerate union mergers or cooperative agreements. Similarly, 
such mergers or other arrangements should also allow unions to pool 
their resources for political activities. 
III. THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM: GOALS, BENEFITS AND 
COSTS 
The United States has experienced a difficult time striking an 
appropriate balance between industry and union strength. Overly harsh 
legal repression of unions has been followed by overly generous 
encouragement. 13 One major form of this encouragement was to exempt 
unions from most applications of the antitrust laws. 
The antitrust exemption originally arose from Congress' desire 
to allow workers to form effective unions. Congress understood that 
workers needed a union to enable them to negotiate as potential equals 
with management (the same overall goal as the Japanese system).14 
Congress desired equality of bargaining potential, and a partial 
exemption of unions from the antitrust laws is required for unions to 
exist at all (since most significant unions can be considered conspiracies 
in restraint of trade). But the exemption that now exists is at least as 
much a creation of the courts as of Congress. It allows multiemployer 
and even industrywide collective bargaining (i.e., all of the employees 
in an industry can join one union, or separate unions can unite in their 
bargaining negotiations)Y This creates monopoly power and imposes 
efficiency costs that do not appear to be required to satisfy congressional 
intent or by considerations of sound public policy. 
A. Benefits From Unions 
The existence of unions may promote efficiency. Unions may be 
a mechanism to reduce contract costs where the firm or employees 
invest in specific human capital. 16 In the absence of unions, both 
employer and employee have an incentive to extract rents 
opportunistically. The union may be able to enhance the credibility of 
workers and ensure the performance oflong-term contracts by preventing 
individual workers from acting opportunistically. At the same time, the 
union provides a credible threat (strike) against companies that attempt 
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opportunistic behavior. Thus, the existence of unions both helps to 
encourage efficiency and also to ensure that workers obtain a "fairer" 
portion of these rents. Some of these efficiencies might depend on the 
size ofthe bargaining unit. We have, however, discovered no important 
examples of efficiencies that require unions larger than the plant or 
firm, other than economies of organization and bargaining. 
B. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Costs From the Existing Labor Exemption 
1. Monopoly Aspects 
33 
The arguments against monopoly power that are applied to 
companies apply with equal force to unions. In both cases prices are 
higher; there is a loss to consumers and deadweight social loss. A 
recent study of 253 NLRB representation elections from 1962 to 1980 
found that stock prices fell both when a petition for union election was There is also a public goods argument for the existence of 
unions. 17 Many features of the work place, such as safety conditions, 
pollution levels, comfort, the speed of the production line, and the 
grievance procedure, have a public goods quality. Many people get the 
gains or no one does. Any individual worker has an insufficient incentive ! 
to provide information on these matters to management because benefits 
accrue to workers collectively. Unions can provide a "voice" and be 
efficient suppliers of information to management. 
I filed and when a union was certified as bargaining agent. 19 The fall in 
stock prices was greater in the cases in which unions ultimately won 
the election. Thus, the negative aspects of unions appear to out-weigh 
their economic benefits to companies. 
Finally, unions may arise and persist as a means of monitoring I 
the effectiveness of management. 18 That is, badly managed firms might 
attract unions, who may be better able to monitor certain management 
inefficiencies and offer helpful advice to management. Thus, the firm 
could realize gains from implementing more effective use of its labor 
force. The view of unions as efficient providers of services has 
considerable support in the empirical literature. For example, unionized 
firms appear to have greater productivity than nonunion firms, and the 
quit rate is much lower for unionized companies, a fact consistent with 
the notion that unions may supply credibility to ensure long-term 
contract fulfillment. 
The question that arises is whether or not there exists a labor policy , 
option that is consistent with the potential for equality of bargaining 
(congressional intent) that will permit the efficiencies of unionization 
and allow unions to protect workers rents, but that is more efficient that 
the current exemption. We have found no evidence that the existence 
of monopoly power by unions (i.e., industrywide collective bargaining) , 
is necessary for, or even related to, those aspects of unions that promote 
efficiency or protect workers' rents. Thus, current antitrust principles f 
suggest a program for achieving better public policy toward collective 
bargaining. Considerations of efficiency, as well as the logic of the 
equality objective, require that unions, like their companies, be subject 
to market power restraints. 
Greg Lewis finds that existing studies on the relative effects of 
unions on wages (there have been over 200 such studies since 1967) 
shoW an average union-nonunion wage differential of about 15 
percent.20 Freeman and Medoff, who are generally very supportive of 
unions, estimate the economic efficiency loss due to unions' wage 
effects of between $5-10 billion per year.21 Their calculations also 
imply a transfer of wealth from shareholders and consumers to union 
members of about 10 times this amount. 
2. Rent Seeking 
The existence of union monopoly power is also the vehicle for 
wasteful rent seeking when unions and some employers conspire to 
raise rival employer's costs. Because firms often have different capital! 
labor ratios, different safety conditions, or different ways of doing 
business, a strategy which raises price by increasing the costs in industry 
can be profitable to the rent seeking firm. For example, if labor costs 
are raised, more capital intensive firms may gain a competitive advantage 
from an industrywide price increase. This type of rent seeking produces 
social loss beyond the usual deadweight loss associated with monopoly 
power. In contrast to the simple monopoly case in which the efficiency 
loss is only the deadweight loss which results from an increase in price, 
competitive restrictions that increase costs lead to an efficiency loss 
that includes the entire increase in cost. 
There are no estimates of the costs of such rent seeking. This 
behavior must, however, be common and the costs substantial.22 In the 
rent seeking that occurs via predatory pricing, the costs to the predator 
are immediate since profits are lost due to the lower price. The gains 
are speculative and occur, if at all, in the future since they arise only if 
the low prices affect subsequent pricing decisions or other rivalrous 
behavior. In contrast, cost-raising rent seeking results in immediate and 
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certain gains. Since the finn gains an immediate relative cost advantage 
vis-a-vis its competitors, the predator need not sacrifice short-tenn 
profits, and the risks of failure are less severe. Unlike the case of 
predatory pricing no deep pocket or superior access to infonnation is 
required. 
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delivered. 24 
The new contract provided that the commissions paid to drivers 
be increased substantially if the volume of milk delivered on a route 
exceeded a specified volume. In addition, any driver whose route was 
split was to receive special compensation. Adams was the only dairy 
with any routes with deliveries above the specified level, and the extra 
cost to Adams from the new contract was substantiaJ.25 Because Adams' 
Two brief examples illustrate how the existing labor exemption 
allows rent seeking behavior to occur: a leading labor law case, Local 
Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and the otherwise 
quite unremarkable case of Adams Dairy v. St. Louis Dairy, 260 F. 2d 
47 (8th Cir. 1958). 
Jewel introduced prepackaged self-service marketing of meat in 
its supennarkets. However, it participated in a multiemployer negotiation 
with the butchers' union which resulted in a a provision that: 
Market operator hours shall be 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on 
Monday through Saturday inclusive. No customer shall be 
served who comes into the market before or after the hours 
set forth. 
I drivers made milk deliveries to supennarkets, Adams' 12 routes were 
high volume routes. The extra cost to Adams should have been about 
$43,200 per year in 1950 dollars. Adams' response was to hire 10 new 
trucks and drivers and split the routes which, of course, meant lower 
salaries to the previous drivers. Four years later, at the end of the 
contract, Adams was using 34 routes to handle deliveries, compared to 
( 12 originally. Adams' drives, however, organized their own separate 
union and signed a new contract; Adams then reduced the number of 
f routes. Adams had to buy new truck, hire new drivers and fundamentally 
change the way it did business. 
This provision would eliminate the advantages of Jewel's prepackaging I 
plan, which allowed customers who shopped at other hours to purchase I' 
meat. Convenience in shopping hours is an extremely important aspect 
of quality in the retail grocery market, and the restriction on marketing ( 
meat after 6:00 p.m. would reduce Jewel's ability to compete by . 
offering more convenient hours. Rivals not offering these convenient r 
hours clearly would have gained from the restriction, since it affected 
Jewel more than them. Jewel objected to this provision and sought to 
have it eliminated as violation of the antitrust laws. However, the Court ,I 
found the hours provision to be a legitimate subject for collective 
bargaining and therefore exempt from the antitrust laws even though I 
the hours that the butchers worked were not directly extended by the . 
arrangement. 
Much of labor law is made up of just such cases.26 Moreover, a 
not insignificant portion of labor negotiations may be viewed as wasteful 
rent seeking by unions and/or companiesY Of course, the existence of 
union monopoly power allows and encourages this type of behavior. 
Yet, the law generally cannot differentiate legitimate collective 
bargaining from illegitimate rent seeking. 
Under existing law it is extraordinarily difficult to detennine 
whether a particular union/management agreement represents the efforts 
of both sides to secure legitimate goals, or to raise the costs of rival 
employers.28 The result - a labor provision which raises costs - is 
often consistent with either explanation. The legality or illegality of 
rent seeking in a union context turns on such questions as the intent of 
the union and the rival employers, whether the subject at issue was one 
of the mandatory subjects of bargaining, whether the restraint in question 
operates directly on the labor market or only indirectly affects the 
market, and whether the employers had the agreement thrust upon 
them or whether they actively sought it. These distinctions have no 
basis in economic theory and are at best difficult and in many cases 
impossible to show. Current legal restrictions will catch only the unwary 
In the Adams Dairy case, Adams, a new entrant into the St. Louis 
dairy market, was subjected to a multiemployer labor contract with a 
provision that in effect singled it out. Prior to Adams entry, retail sales ' 
of milk to grocery stores had been small in comparison with sales of 
home-delivered milk.23 Adams introduced the sale of milk in paper 
cartons at grocery stores and sold its milk at a lower price than home-
delivered milk. The Milk Drivers Union served as bargaining agent for 
the employees of various dairies, and delivery costs were a substantial 
fraction of milk's retail price. Under the union contract drivers received 
r' and the unwise. For the sophisticated, it is easy in a multiemployer 
bargaining unit to present an appearance that conforms with the law 
while achieving an effect consistent with rent seeking. Thus, rent 
seeking problems arise naturally from existing labor exemption and a base salary plus commissions detennined by the volume of milk 
, 
I 
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there is no way that the existing framework distinguished beneficial I 
cases from harmful ones. In the next section we propose one way out: 
change the overall framework of the labor exemption. 
IV. A BETTER BALANCE? 
Our proposal to eliminate the monopoly aspects of the labor 
exemption yet retain unions' efficiencies is simple and straightforward: 
treat unions and corporations equally and symmetrically with respect' 
to mergers, and forbid agreements between unions to restrain trade if 
similar agreements between corporations would be illegal. This approach 
would treat unions and corporations alike under the antitrust laws: for 
both unions and corporations we would permit union mergers, joint 
ventures, etc., except those for which the anticompetitive potential was I 
likely to outweigh the procompetitive benefits. Conglomerate and i 
vertical agreements between unions or mergers would, of course, usually , 
be allowed. A further provision to ensure equality of bargaining ability I 
would be to allow unions within a single company to merge regardless I 
of the companies' or unions' market shares (that is, a union could 
always be at least as large as its company). We would also exempt I 
completely unions representing only a small number of workers. I 
To implement this approach, the Justice Department and/or the 
Federal Trade Commission could develop a set of merger guidelines 
for unions similar to those now used for corporate mergers. Under the 
Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines, virtually all horizontal 
corporate mergers up to approximately an Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) increase of 50-100 (depending upon the postmerger HHI) are 
allowed. The basic methodology for applying the Guidelines' analysis I 
is (1) define the relevant product and geographic markets; (2) calculate 
the concentration level within that market and the increase in 
concentration due to the merger; and (3) determine the effect of a large 
number of factors (or potential defenses) that will make the government ' 
more or less likely to sue. Perhaps the simplest way to resolve the 
trade-off for unions is to use these same approaches and standards for I 
union mergers as well. Thus, union mergers would only be permitte.d 
up to the Guideline limits. After these levels the union could grow If 
their companies hired additional workers, but the unions could not 
engage in merger or in unionizing unaffiliated workers if this would 
violate the Guidelines. Similarly, all cooperative agreements between 
unions would be permitted if the unions involved would be permitted ! 
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to merge, or if similar agreements would be legal if undertaken by 
corporations. Agreements between large, horizontally competin~ unions, 
however, could -lik~ similar arrangements between large, honzontally 
competing corporations - be found to be illegal under the antitrust 
lawS. 
The implementation of these simple proposals would have a 
number of important benefits. Union monopoly power would be reduced, 
as would the rent seeking that arises from it. Competition would be 
permitted among unions within an industry, and am?~g union lea~~rs, 
with all of the resultant desirable effects of competItIOn. CompetItIOn 
among unions would determine which union could convince workers 
that it could secure the best benefits and working conditions for its 
members, perhaps weeding out inefficient unions and union leaders. 
This competition could also weed out corrupt union leaders who pay 
themselves too much, take bribes, or sell out to management. It could 
also make unions move responsive to their members. 
Any organizational or bargaining advantages inherent in large 
size could be realized through small horizontal, or virtually any vertical 
or conglomerate merger or agreement. Indeed, we fully expect that 
such mergers or other forms of cooperation would be common. Any 
union which believed, for example, that it lacked adequate strike funds 
or organizing or negotiating experience, could enter into any merger to 
give it the necessary strength as long as. it did not violate the M~r~er 
Guidelines. Alternatively, the union mIght be able to form a Jomt 
venture which would accomplish its goals. These arrangements 
constitute a large part of our answer to those who might believe that 
our proposal would lead to small, weak, uniformed, underfinanced 
"company" unions. 
Thus, we believe that our profered approach is halfway between 
the current U.S. and Japanese models. It would continue to permit the 
realization of union-generated efficiencies and protection of workers' 
rents. It would continue to provide equality of bargaining positions. 
But it would avoid both the rent seeking and monopoly aspects of the 
U.S. system, and the union weakness inherent in the Japanese system. 
Our halfway solution might well combine the best features of each. 
The reduction in monopoly power resulting from our prosposal 
should also enhance the public image of unions. Union growth would 
depend more on the unions efficiently meeting workers needs and in 
contributing to the production process than on their monopoly power 
or rent seeking ability. Good unions (and union leaders) to a far greater 
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extent would tend to drive out bad ones. And, it would be less likely 
that segments of the economy would become un competitive due to 
higher costs arising from union monopoly power, thus increas~ng the 
potential number of unionized workers .. Our pr~posals ~ay, mdee~, 
stimulate union growth. Currently, a major bamer to theIr growth IS 
employer opposition. But if unions are less likely to g~in monop?ly 
power, employer resistance will diminish. Employers WIll for the fIrst 
time have the opportunity to obtain union efficiencies yet avoid 
monopoly power. 
The costs of our proposal are several. First, there is a trade-off 
between union size and multiemployer bargaining on the one hand and 
negotiating costs on the other. Since our proposal woul~ reduce t~e 
size of some bargaining units, it may well cause small mcreases III 
negotiating costs in these cases. Further, during a transition period we 
might expect collusive activity, given unions' .established patte:ns ~f 
behavior. A law which attempted to stop umons from engagmg III 
certain types of conspiracies, cooperation, or mergers, would 
undoubtedly be ignored and resisted, at least initially. It could also 
have short term negative effects on worker morale and productivity 
and might lead to violence by disgruntled union members. 
Moreover, unions could still observe each others' behavior and act 
interdependently. So would employers. One employer would be reluctant 
to give in to wage demands unless it knew that its rivals would also. 
Employers and unions would both have an incentive to behave like 
oligopolists. Further, one practical problem could arise from this ~aper.'s 
approach: it would require evaluating mergers between corporatIons III 
terms of both corporate and union market shares (and other factors). 
We recognize that our approach stands little change of cu~ent 
implementation due to political constraints. Existing uni~ns are unlIkely 
to be broken up. An alternative approach would be to Implement our 
proposal only prospectively. This would mean that ~nio?s not already 
united could not do so if this would violate the GUIdelmes. It would 
also mean that unions within new companies might be prevented from 
joining existing national unions if this would violate· the Mer~er 
Guidelines. Prospective implementation would over time reduce umon 
monopoly power. While prospective implementation would take time 
to prevent the abuses resulting from union monopoly power, where 
union monopoly power existed other companies and rival unions would 
be attracted to enter the market (just as a product monopolist attracts 
new entrants). These new entrants would reduce the monopoly power 
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of existing unions. The effects could be similar to those seen recently 
in unionized industries that have become deregulated. The deregulation 
produced new entrants and made union control more difficult. 
v. CONCLUSIONS 
We do not contend that adopting a system halfway between the 
existing Japanese and American collective bargaining structures would 
cure a large portion or America's industrial woes. We also acknowledge 
that the problems we discuss are much less severe than they used to be. 
But this does not mean that the issue should be ignored; it is still 
significant 29 and might be more so in 20 years. Much of the value of 
our proposal would be to lock in place the advantages of the United 
States collective bargaining system that are currently evolving and to 
nudge it somewhat in the right direction. 
Indeed, the fact that the labor market seems currently to be moving 
towards our suggested solution might diminish political opposition to 
our proposal. While in the past it was usually true that every comparable 
worker within an industry received similar wages and benefits, in 
recent years this rigidity has broken down. Part of this breakdown is 
due to recent deregulation successes and to increased foreign 
competition. Both reduce union monopoly power and given unions' 
incentives to develop a two tier wage system with lower wages for new 
hires. A similar arrangement arose a few years ago in the automobile 
industry, where United Autoworkers union members were paid more if 
they worked for General Motors than if they worked for Chrysler. 
, Airline employees - pilots, machinists, and flight attendants - are 
increasingly likely to be paid different wages by different firms. 
Union and nonunion workers in one industry are also becoming 
more common, even though this means that some workers earn more 
than others for doing the same job. Because different wage rates in one 
, industry and within one union create significant internal tension within 
the union, perhaps a natural response has been to leave the lower paid 
workers out of the union. 
A significant wage differential among members of a single union 
for an extended period - with or without a transfer payment among 
workers (such a transfer could consist, for example, of General Motors 
r workers paying a larger share of a common automobile industry strike 
fund)- could cause workers' desire for multiemployer bargaining to 
weaken, and could even cause an industrywide union or collective 
bargaining unit to fragment. Industrywide pacts in industries such as 
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steel are also experiencing greater instability, largely due to increasing 
differences between the companies. Thus, there are definite signs of a 
recent trend away from multi employer bargaining, and perhaps towards 
a solution similar to that proposed in this paper. Perhaps our solution 
will be implemented through market forces, rather than legislation. 
But we do not expect the existing system to evolve rapidly enough. 
Moreover, in contrast to the overall trend in antitrust towards the goal 
of enhanced economic efficiency, we find no such trend involving 
labor exemption cases. Further, the relatively recent labor exemption 
statutes have tended to reflect either pro-union or pro-management 
positions, rather than attempting to benefit the economy as a whole. 
, 
I 
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper was to raise for discussion 
the desirability of adopting one Japanese collective bargaining practice, 
and subjecting unions and multiemployer bargaining units to the antitrust I" 
laws in a way that outlaws industrywide collective bargaining. This 
proposal might substantially fulfill the primary goals underlying the r 
labor exemption, but more efficiently than the prevailing system. It 
might help U.S. industries acquire some of those features of the Japanese 
system which may be helpful to our economy, while at the same time 
avoiding the problem inherent in overly weak or "company" unions. 
Whether such a solution actually would be superior to the present 
system depends on several unanswered, mostly empirical, questions, 
that have been discussed throughout this paper. Our purpose was to 
suggest that carefully specified limitations on union monopoly power 
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ENHANCED CHILD RELIEF AS WORK INCENTIVE 
AND POPULATION MEASURES - AN EXPERIMENT 
IN SINGAPORE PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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In the fifties and early sixties, Singapore experienced a very high 
rate of population growth. l Rapid population growth imposes its burdens 
on the economy in the form of a high dependency ratio, heavy social 
service requirements, and a subsequent employment problem. Therefore, 
"Stop At Two" was the catchword in those days. However, over the 
last quarter century, rapid economic growth, full employment, and 
slow domestic labour force growth due to declining birth rates have 
changed the scenario completely. The culmination has been a reverse 
of the Government's population policy and the replacement of the 
catchword "Stop At Two" by "Three Or More If You Can Afford It" in 
the mid-eighties. This article will review the use of enhanced child 
relief and tax rebates as work incentive and popUlation measures in 
Singapore personal income taxation in response to demographic changes 
during this period. 
II. ISSUES AND MEASURES 
While the Government officially embarked on family planning 
with the formation of the Singapore Family Planning and Population 
Board in 1966, the first anti- natalist fiscal measure was put into force 
when the Government announced in October 1972 that, with effect 
from the year of assessment 1974, no deduction would be allowed in 
respect of any child born on or after 1st August 1973 if the child was 
the fourth or subsequent child. The deductions allowable for the first 
three children were $750 ( Singapore currency) each for the first two 
children and $500 for the third child.2 As economic development of 
Singapore accelerates, labour shortage becomes increasingly acute. 
Singapore relies heavily on foreign workers. The proportion of foreign 
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